

**THE
HANDBOOK
OF
BOARD
GOVERNANCE**

SECOND EDITION

**A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
FOR PUBLIC, PRIVATE,
AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT
BOARD MEMBERS**

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