Rational Choice in an Uncertain

PEDITION

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Contents

Preface		ix
1.	Thinking and Deciding	1
	1.1 Decision Making Is a Skill	1
	1.2 Thinking: Automatic and Controlled	3
	1.3 The Computational Model of the Mind	6
	1.4 Through Darkest Psychoanalytic Theory	
	and Behaviorism to Cognition	11
	1.5 Quality of Choice: Rationality	16
	1.6 The Invention of Modern Decision Theory	18
	References	21
2.	What Is Decision Making?	23
	2.1 Definition of a Decision	23
	2.2 Picturing Decisions	26
	2.3 Decision Quality, Revisited	30
	2.4 Incomplete Thinking: A Legal Example	32
	2.5 Over-Inclusive Thinking: Sunk Costs	34
	2.6 The Rationality of Considering Only the Future	40
	2.7 The Rest of This Book	42
	References	43
3.	A General Framework for Judgment	45
	3.1 A Conceptual Framework for Judgment and Prediction	45
	3.2 Research With the Lens Model Framework	50
	3.3 Capturing Judgment in Statistical Models	53
	3.4 How Do Statistical Models Beat Human Judgment?	56
	3.5 Practical Implications of the Surprising	
	Success of the Linear Model	60

	3.6 Objections and Rebuttals	62
	3.7 The Role of Judgment in Choices and Decisions	67
	References	68
1	The Fundamental Judgment Strategy:	
4.	Anchoring and Adjustment	71
	· ·	
	4.1 Salient Values	71
	4.2 Anchoring and (Insufficient) Adjustment	73
	4.3 Anchoring on Ourselves	80
	4.4 Anchoring the Past in the Present	83
	References	85
5.	Judging Heuristically	87
	5.1 Going Beyond the Information Given	87
	5.2 Estimating Frequencies and Probabilities	88
	5.3 Availability of Memories	89
	5.4 Biased Samples in Memory	92
	5.5 Biased Sampling From Memory	94
	5.6 Availability to the Imagination	97
	5.7 From Availability to Probability and Causality	98
	5.8 Judgment by Similarity: Same Old Things	101
	5.9 Representative Thinking	105
	5.10 The Ratio Rule	108
	References	115
6.	Explanation-Based Judgments	117
	6.1 Everyone Likes a Good Story	117
	6.2 The Conjunction Probability Error (Again)	118
	6.3 Judging From Explanations	120
	6.4 Legal Scenarios: The Best Story Wins in the Courtroom	123
	6.5 Scenarios About Ourselves	128
	6.6 Scenarios About the Unthinkable	130
	6.7 Hindsight: Reconstructing the Past	133
	6.8 Sometimes It's Better to Forget	137
	References	137
7.	Chance and Cause	139
	7.1 Misconceptions About Chance	139
	7.2 Illusions of Control	141
	7.3 Seeing Causal Structure Where It Isn't	143
	7.4 Regression Toward the Mean	150
	7.5 Reflections on Our Inability to Accept Randomness	155
	References	155

Q	Thinking Rationally About Uncertainty	157
σ.	·	
	8.1 What to Do About the Biases	157
	8.2 Getting Started Thinking in Terms of Probabilities	159
	8.3 Comprehending the Situation Being Judged	163
	8.4 Testing for Rationality	168
	8.5 How to Think About Inverse Probabilities	170
	8.6 Avoiding Subadditivity and Conjunction Errors	174
	8.7 The Other Side of the Coin: The Probability of a Disjunction of Events	177
	The Probability of a Disjunction of Events	177
	8.8 Changing Our Minds: Bayes's Theorem	178 184
	8.9 Statistical Decision Theory	188
	8.10 Concluding Comment on Rationality References	190
	References	190
9.	Evaluating Consequences: Fundamental Preferences	193
	9.1 What Good Is Happiness?	193
	9.2 The Role of Emotions in Evaluations	198
	9.3 The Value of Money	201
	9.4 Decision Utility—Predicting What We Will Value	209
	9.5 Constructing Values	213
	References	215
10.	From Preferences to Choices	217
	10.1 Deliberate Choices Among Complex Alternatives	217
	10.2 Ordering Alternatives	223
	10.3 Grouping Alternatives	229
	10.4 Choosing Unconsciously	230
	10.5 How to Make Good Choices	233
	10.0 110 11 10 1111111 0004 0110100	255
	References	234
11.		
11.	References	234
11.	References A Rational Decision Theory	234 237
11.	References A Rational Decision Theory 11.1 Formally Defining Rationality	234 237
11.	References A Rational Decision Theory 11.1 Formally Defining Rationality 11.2 Making Theories	234 237 237
11.	References A Rational Decision Theory 11.1 Formally Defining Rationality 11.2 Making Theories Understandable—The Axiomatic Method	234 237 237 241
11.	References A Rational Decision Theory 11.1 Formally Defining Rationality 11.2 Making Theories Understandable—The Axiomatic Method 11.3 Defining Rationality: Expected Utility Theory	234 237 237 241 244
11.	References A Rational Decision Theory 11.1 Formally Defining Rationality 11.2 Making Theories Understandable—The Axiomatic Method 11.3 Defining Rationality: Expected Utility Theory 11.4 Traditional Objections to the Axioms	234 237 237 241 244 259
11.	References A Rational Decision Theory 11.1 Formally Defining Rationality 11.2 Making Theories Understandable—The Axiomatic Method 11.3 Defining Rationality: Expected Utility Theory 11.4 Traditional Objections to the Axioms 11.5 The Shoulds and Dos of the System	234 237 237 241 244 259 263
11.	References A Rational Decision Theory 11.1 Formally Defining Rationality 11.2 Making Theories Understandable—The Axiomatic Method 11.3 Defining Rationality: Expected Utility Theory 11.4 Traditional Objections to the Axioms 11.5 The Shoulds and Dos of the System 11.6 Some Bum Raps for Decision Analysis References	234 237 237 241 244 259 263 268
	References A Rational Decision Theory 11.1 Formally Defining Rationality 11.2 Making Theories Understandable—The Axiomatic Method 11.3 Defining Rationality: Expected Utility Theory 11.4 Traditional Objections to the Axioms 11.5 The Shoulds and Dos of the System 11.6 Some Bum Raps for Decision Analysis References	234 237 237 241 244 259 263 268 270

	12.3 Loss Aversion	288
	12.4 Look to the Future	291
	References	292
13.	What's Next? New Directions in	
	Research on Judgment and Decision Making	295
	13.1 The Neuroscience of Decisions	296
	13.2 Emotions in Decision Making	304
	13.3 The Rise of Experimental Methods to	
	Study Dynamic Decisions	310
	13.4 Do We Really Know Where We're Headed?	315
	References	315
14.	In Praise of Uncertainty	319
	14.1 Uncertainty as Negative	319
	14.2 The Illusion of Hedonic Certainty	325
	14.3 The Price of Denying Uncertainty	326
	14.4 Two Cheers for Uncertainty	331
	14.5 Living With Uncertainty	333
	References	334
Appendix: Basic Principles of Probability Theory		337
Index		361
About the Authors		373