

The Economics of Entrepreneurship

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Contents

<i>List of figures</i>	<i>page</i>	xv
<i>List of tables</i>		xvi
<i>Preface</i>		xvii
1 Introduction		1
1.1 What economics adds to the study of entrepreneurship		2
1.2 Coverage and structure of the book		5
1.3 Defining and measuring entrepreneurship		6
1.3.1 New venture creation and nascent entrepreneurs		7
1.3.2 Small firms		10
1.3.3 Self-employment/business ownership		10
1.3.4 Appraisal		15
1.4 International evidence about entrepreneurship rates in developed countries		15
1.5 The transition economies of Eastern Europe		19
1.6 Developing countries		22
1.7 Appendix: habitual entrepreneurs		24
Part I Selection		29
2 Theories of entrepreneurship *		31
2.1 'Early' theories of entrepreneurship	•	32
2.2 The occupational choice model of entrepreneurship I: homogeneous agents_		36
2.2.1 Definitions of risk aversion and risk		37
2.2.2 Simple static models		38
2.2.3 Dynamic models ..		39
2.3 The occupational choice model II: heterogeneous ability - the Lucas (1978) model		41
2.3.1 The Lucas model		41

2.3.2	Criticisms of the Lucas model	43
2.3.3	Variants and extensions of the Lucas model	44
2.4	The occupational choice model III : heterogeneous risk attitudes - the Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) model	49
2.5	The very existence of an entrepreneurial option	51
2.5.1	Theory of the firm considerations	52
2.5.2	Non-profit-maximising ventures	57
2.6	Incumbents' characteristics: entrepreneurial spawning	61
2.6.1	Organisational limitations of incumbent firms	63
2.6.2	Agency cost theories	65
2.6.3	Learning theories	67
2.7	Macroeconomic theories of entrepreneurship and growth	67
2.7.1	Wealth-based theories	68
2.7.2	Technology-based theories	70
2.7.3	Knowledge-based theories	72
2.8	Multiple equilibrium models	74
2.9	Conclusion	76
2.10	Appendices	77
2.10.1	Technical definitions of risk aversion and risk	77
2.10.2	A simple 'hire or outsource' model	79
2.10.3	Landier's serial entrepreneurship multiple equilibrium model	81
2.10.4	Parker's human capital multiple equilibrium model	82
3	Empirical methods in entrepreneurship research	86
3.1	Cross-section regression models: sample selection bias and IV	87
3.1.1	Sample selection bias	87
3.1.2	Endogeneity and IV	88
3.2	Cross-section binary models of occupational choice	90
3.3	Extensions of the cross-section binary model	92
3.3.1	The inclusion of relative incomes	92
3.3.2	Multiple occupational choices	94
3.3.3	Multiple equation systems	94
3.3.4	Non-binary occupational choices	96
3.3.5	Heteroscedastic probit	96
3.4	Time-series models	96
3.5	Panel-data models	98
3.6	Entrepreneurial duration models	100
3.7	Appendices	101
3.7.1	The reduced form of the two-equation simultaneous equation model	101
3.7.2	Fraser and Greene's (2006) heteroscedastic probit model	102

4	Evidence about the determinants of entrepreneurship	106
4.1	Pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives	107
4.1.1	Pecuniary incentives: relative earnings	109
4.1.2	Desire for independence and job satisfaction	110
4.2	Human capital	113
4.2.1	Age	113
4.2.2	Experience	115
4.2.3	Formal education	117
4.3	Social capital	119
4.4	Risk attitudes, over-optimism and other psychological traits	121
4.4.1	Risk attitudes and risk	121
4.4.2	Over-optimism and over-confidence	124
4.4.3	Other psychological trait variables	128
4.5	Demographic and industry characteristics	132
4.5.1	Marital status	132
4.5.2	Health issues	133
4.5.3	Family background	134
4.5.4	Industry characteristics	138
4.6	Macroeconomic factors	139
4.6.1	Technology as a determinant of entrepreneurship	139
4.6.2	Knowledge spillovers and growth	140
4.6.3	Entrepreneurship and the business cycle	142
4.6.4	Unemployment	143
4.6.5	Regional factors	147
4.7	Nascent entrepreneurship	151
4.7.1	Characteristics of nascent entrepreneurs	151
4.7.2	Venture development paths of nascent entrepreneurs	152
4.8	Dependent starts and firm characteristics	155
4.9	Conclusion	157
5	Ethnic entrepreneurship and immigration	163
5.1	Discrimination	165
5.1.1	Discrimination in the labour market	165
5.1.2	Discrimination in the capital market	166
5.1.3	Discrimination in the product market	170
5.2	Positive factors	171
5.2.1	Positive expected relative returns in entrepreneurship	171
5.2.2	Ethnic enclaves	172
5.2.3	Culture	173
5.2.4	Role models and inculcation of positive attitudes	174
5.3	Further evidence on determinants of ethnic differences in entrepreneurship	174

5.4	Immigration and entrepreneurship	176
5.4.1	Immigrants' entrepreneurial propensities	176
5.4.2	The determinants of immigrant entrepreneurship	177
5.4.3	The effects of immigration on entrepreneurship	180
5.5	Appendix	181
5.5.1	The Borjas (1986) decomposition	181
6	Female entrepreneurship	184
6.1	Some basic facts about female entrepreneurship	184
6.2	Family factors	187
6.2.1	Marriage and household production	187
6.2.2	The impact of children	188
6.3	Performance of women entrepreneurs	189
6.3.1	The gender earnings gap	190
6.3.2	Explanations of the earnings gap	191
6.3.3	Other performance gaps: growth and survival rates	194
6.4	Women and entrepreneurial finance	195
6.5	Conclusion	197
Part II	Financing	201
7	Debt finance for entrepreneurial ventures	203
7.1	Background and useful terminology	205
7.1.1	Background	205
7.1.2	Terminology	209
7.2	Theories of credit rationing and redlining	212
7.2.1	Type I credit rationing	212
7.2.2	Type II credit rationing, redlining and under-investment	212
7.3	Rebuttals of the credit rationing hypothesis and counter-rebuttal	216
7.3.1	Rebuttals	216
7.3.2	Counter-rebuttals	221
7.4	Over-investment	223
7.4.1	The de Meza and Webb (1987) over-investment model	223
7.4.2	Over-optimism	225
7.5	Conclusion	226
7.6	Appendices	228
7.6.1	Bernhardt's (2000) model of Type I rationing	228
7.6.2	Stiglitz and Weiss' (1981) model of Type II credit rationing	229
7.6.3	Bester's (1985a) screening model	230

8	Venture capital and other sources of finance	234
8.1	Venture capital and entrepreneurs	235
8.1.1	Organisational structure	235
8.1.2	Size of the entrepreneurial venture capital market	238
8.2	Advantages of venture capital finance for entrepreneurs	239
8.2.1	Value-adding activities by VCs	239
8.2.2	Equity finance as an optimal financial contract	242
8.3	Drawbacks of venture capital and equity finance for entrepreneurs	244
8.3.1	Factors inhibiting the use of equity finance	244
8.3.2	Equity rationing, funding gaps and under-investment	246
8.4	Informal equity finance: business angels	248
8.5	Other informal sources of finance	250
8.5.1	Family finance	250
8.5.2	Micro-finance schemes	251
8.5.3	Other non-profit-making lending organisations and schemes	257
8.5.4	Co-operative schemes	257
8.5.5	Trade credit	259
8.6	Conclusion	261
9	Wealth and entrepreneurship	263
9.1-	The role of entrepreneurs in aggregate wealth accumulation and inequality	264
9.2	The 'private equity premium puzzle'	266
9.3	Entrepreneurial wealth diversification	268
9.4	Wealth and entrepreneurship: theories	269
9.4.1	The Evans and Jovanovic (1989) model	269
9.4.2	The Banerjee and Newman (1993) model	271
9.4.3	The Aghion and Bolton (1997) model	272
9.4.4	Newman's (2007) moral hazard model	272
9.5	Wealth and entrepreneurship: evidence	273
9.6	Alternative interpretations of a wealth/entrepreneurship relationship	275
9.7	Wealth and performance in entrepreneurship	279
9.7.1	Effects of wealth on venture survival	279
9.7.2	Effects of wealth on venture investment decisions	280
9.7.3	Borrowing constraints and profitability	280
9.8	Evidence relating to Type II credit rationing	281
9.8.1	What does <i>not</i> constitute evidence of credit rationing	282
9.8.2	Berger and Udell's (1992) approach	282
9.8.3	Other evidence	283
9.9	Conclusion	284
9.10	Appendices	285
9.10.1	Preferences for skewness and entrepreneurship	285
9.10.2	The Paulson <i>et al.</i> (2006) structural model	286

Part III Performance	291
10 Entrepreneurship, job creation and innovation	293
10.1 Job creators	293
10.1.1 Some basic facts about entrepreneurs' labour demand	293
10.1.2 Theoretical analysis	294
10.1.3 Evidence	295
10.2 Job creation by small firms	297
10.3 Innovation by small firms	300
10.3.1 Theoretical arguments	301
10.3.2 Evidence about innovation	303
10.4 Conclusion	305
10.5 Appendix	306
10.5.1 Carroll <i>et al.</i> 's (2000a) model of labour demand and taxation	306
11 Entrepreneurship and growth	310
11.1 Theories of venture growth	311
11.1.1 Gibrat's Law _f	311
11.1.2 Jovanovic's (1982) model of industry selection	312
11.1.3 Innovation, growth and shakeouts	314
11.1.4 Other theories of growth	315
11.2 Evidence about the growth of entrepreneurial ventures	316
11.2.1 Definitional and measurement issues	317
11.2.2 Evidence about determinants of venture growth	319
11.3 Entrepreneurship and economic growth	324
11.4 Appendix	330
12 Entrepreneurial effort	333
12.1 Unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship	334
12.1.1 Conceptual issues	334
12.1.2 Evidence	338
12.2 Work effort	340
12.2.1 Hours of work	341
12.2.2 Explaining entrepreneurs' work hours	343
12.3 Ageing, retirement and entrepreneurship	351
12.4 Entrepreneurial learning	356
12.5 Appendices	357
12.5.1 Frank's model of entrepreneurs' labour supply and ageing	357
12.5.2 Parker and Rougier's model of the entrepreneurial retirement decision	359

13	Entrepreneurs' incomes and returns to human capital	••	363
13.1	Measurement issues: tax evasion and income under-reporting		364
13.2	Other measurement problems		368
13.3	Evidence relating to entrepreneurs' relative incomes		369
13.4	The inequality and volatility of entrepreneurs' incomes		372
13.5	Determinants of entrepreneurs' incomes: theory and methods		375
13.6	Determinants of entrepreneurs' incomes: findings		378
	13.6.1 Entrepreneurs' rate of return to education		378
	13.6.2 Other explanatory variables and extensions		380
14	Survival		385
14.1	Closure is not necessarily failure		386
14.2	Survival rates and their distribution		388
14.3	Theoretical determinants of survival		389
	14.3.1 The liabilities of newness and smallness		389
	14.3.2 Other factors		391
14.4	Empirical determinants of survival		391
14.5	Conclusion		396
Part IV	Public policy		401
15	Principles of entrepreneurship policy		403
15.1	The case for and against pro-entrepreneurship public policies		405
	15.1.1 The case for pro-entrepreneurship policies		405
	15.1.2 The case against pro-entrepreneurship policies		407
15.2	Principles of entrepreneurship policy design		408
15.3	Entrepreneurship policy evaluation		409
16	Finance and innovation policies		412
16.1	Loan guarantee schemes		412
	16.1.1 Organisation of LGSs		412
	16.1.2 Theoretical perspectives on LGSs		413
	16.1.3 Evaluation of LGSs		415
16.2	Other credit market interventions		417
16.3	Policies to promote equity	finance	i
	16.3.1 Regulatory policies		419
	16.3.2 Taxation policies		421
16.4	Innovation policy and entrepreneurship		423
16.5	Appendix: the Keuschnigg-Nielsen (2004a, 2006) double moral hazard model		425

17	Taxation, regulation and other policies	428
17.1	Taxation	428
17.1.1	Income and payroll taxes: theoretical issues	429
17.1.2	Income and payroll taxes: empirical evidence	433
17.1.3	Corporation tax	436
17.1.4	Wealth, and inheritance taxes	437
17.2	Labour and product market schemes	438
17.2.1	Employment assistance schemes	438
17.2.2	Procurement and affirmative action schemes	440
17.2.3	Business advice and assistance	440
17.3	Regulation.	442
17.3.1	The regulation of entry	442
17.3.2	The regulation of exit (bankruptcy)	446
17.3.3	Property rights and corporate governance	448
17.3.4	The regulation of employment	450
17.3.5	The regulation of credit markets	451
17.3.6	Costs of compliance with regulations	453
17.3.7	Conclusions	454
17.4	The welfare state, trade unions, enterprise culture and instability	455
17.4.1	The size of the welfare state	455
17.4.2	Social security transfers and trade unions	457
17.4.3	Fostering an enterprise culture	457
17.4.4	Political and economic instability	458
17.5	Conclusion	459
	<i>References</i>	466
	<i>Index</i>	541