Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules

by

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Contents

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Foreword - •,	V
Preface . \	vii
Table of Cases	xvii
Table of Legislation ^	xxvii
Chapter 1 Introduction - Tension Between Intellectual	
Property Rights (iprs) and Competition Rules and the	v 7 '
Principle of Free Movement	
1.1 BIBLIOGRAPHY.	
Chapter 2 Free Movement of Goods	
2.1 JUDGMENTS ON EXHAUSTION OF PATENTS	
2.1.1 'Specific Subject Matter'	
2.1.2 Merck v Stephar.	
2.2 EXHAUSTION OF TRADEMARKS	
2.3 EXHAUSTION OF COPYRIGHT	
2.4 NO INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION	14
2.5 SALE WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET '.' "' ^	1.4
WITH THE HOLDER'S CONSENT	
2.6 CONCLUSION. 2.7 BIBUOGRAPHY.	
2.7 BIBUUGKAPHY	20
Chapter 3 Status of Various Sources of Law	21
3.1 JUDGMENTS	21
3.2 DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION	21
3.3 RECITALS TO AN ACT	22
3.4 GUIDELINES.	23
3.5 COMFORT LETTERS	26
Chapter 4 Article 81	2
4.1 HISTORICAL ATTITUDE OF COMMISSION	
AND COURTS TOWARDS LICENSING.	3(
4.1.1 Exclusive Licences with and without Export Bans	
4.1.1.1 Exclusive Patent and Know-How Licences	
4.1.1.2 Exclusive Licences of Plant Breeders' Rights.	
4.1.1.3 Exclusive Licences of Performing Rights	
4.1.1 A Copyright Collecting Societies	
1 2 3	

adi Contents

4.1.1.5 The Software Directive	37
4.1.1.6 Software Licensing	38
4.1.2 No Challenge Provisions	38
4.1.3 Feed and Grantback Provisions	
4.1.4 Royalties to Continue After the Last	
Intellectual Property Right Expires	42
4.1.5 Single Branding Obligations.	
4.2 COMMISSION'S MORE RECENT VIEWS.	
4.3 BIBLIOGRAPHY	
Chapter 5 The New Group Exemption for	4.5
Technology Transfer - Regulation 772/04 (TTBER)	
5.1 OUTLINE OF THE REGULATION	46
5.2 COVERAGE OF THE TECHNOLOGY	
TRANSFER GROUP EXEMPTION (ARTICLE 2).	
5.2.1 Definitions	50
5.2.2 Relationship with other Group	
»* • Exemptions (Gs 56-64)	
5.2.2.1 Specialisation and R & D (Gs 57-60)	
5.2.2.2 Vertical Agreements (Gs 61-64)	51
5.3 CEILING OF MARKET SHARES (ARTICLE 3)	51
y 5.3.1 Competing Undertakings (Article l(1){j))	54
5.3.2 Conclusion on Market Shares	55
5.4 HARDCORE RESTRAINTS (ARTICLE 4, R 13 AND GS 74-76)	56
$_t$, 5,4.1 As between Competitors (Article 4(1)	
and Gs 77-95)	57
6i 5.4.1.1 Price Fixing (Article 4(1)(a), Gs 79-81)	57
5.4.1.2 Limitation of Output (Gs 82-83)	58
^ 5.4.1.3 Allocation of Markets or Customers	
* 5.4.1.4 Sole Licences (Article 4(l)(c)(iii), G 88)	59
fr 5.4.1.5 Field of Use Restrictions and Exclusive	
i Licences (Article 4(l)(c)(i) and (ii), G 86)	60
*£ 5.4.1.6 No Poaching Provisions in	
^	
f> & (v), Gs 87 and 89)	6
it 5.4.1.7 Captive Use and Second Source *JW	
(Article $4(l)(c)(vi)$ and (vii) , Gs 92-93)	61
-^ 5.4.1.8 Restriction on Licensee	
,, Using its Own Technology (Article 4(l)(d),	
Gs 81, 94, 95 and!57)	6.
5.4.2 Hardcore List as between Non Competitors	
(Article 4(2),Gs 96-106)	64
K? 5.4.2.1 Price Restrictions (Article 4(2)(a) and G 97)	
"*' 5.4.2.2 Territorial Restrictions on Licensee	
° "	6

Contents xiii

6
6
7
8
8
68
9
0
0
70
14
5
7
•
77
78
8
8
80
31
32
33
34

xiy Contents

6.2.6 Commission Concerned about Dividing Market	0.5
Power Between Licensor and its Licensees	85
6.3 GUIDELINES DEALING MAINLY WITH AGREEMENTS	
OUTSIDE THE REGULATION	86
6.3.1 No Presumption that Agreements Outside the	
TIBER Infringe Article 81	
rf. 6.3.2 Market Power	86
6.3.2.1 Market Shares of Parties and their	
; Cost Advantages	
6.3.2.2 Barriers to Entry	
6.3.2.3 Maturity of the Market	89
6.3.2.4 Cumulative Effects	89
6.3.2.5 Market Power of Competitors	
6.3.2.6 Buyer Power	90
6.3.3 Possible Negative Effects of Restrictive	
Licence Agreements	91
6.3.4 Balance Benefits and Detriments in their	
Actual Context Under Article 81(3)	92
6.3.5 Analysis of the Four Conditions of Article 81(3)	93
6.4 APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 81 TO VARIOUS TYPES OF	
LICENSING RESTRAINTS (GS 153-235)	97
6.4.1 Agreements that Do Not Restrict	
Competition Within Article 81(1)	97
6.4.1.1 Royalties	
6.4.1.2 Restrictions on Production within a	
Specified Territory (Gs 161-167)	99
6.4.1.3 Sales Restrictions in Agreements	
between Competitors (Gs 169-171)	101
6.4.1 A Sales Restrictions in Agreements between	
Non-Competitors (Gs 172-173)	102
6.4.1.5 Criticism of Distinctions between Production	
^ and Sales Exclusivity and between Protection	
from Active and Passive Sales	104
"""*- 6A.1.6 Output Restrictions between	
Competitors (Gs 82 and 175)	105
"" 6.4.1.7 Output Restrictions between	
Non-Competitors (Gs 176-178)	105
'**' 6.4.1.8 FlièeddaffUlsæ Resstmictiioms between	
Actual or Potential Competitors (Gs 179-183).	106
i"/ ' 6A.1.9 Field of Use Restrictions between	
Non-Competitors (Gs 184-185)	107
6.4.1.10 Captive Use Restrictions (Gs 186-190)	108
6.4.1.11 Tying and Bundling (Gs 191-195)	
6.4.1.12 Non-Compete Obligations (Gs 196-203)	I11
N	

Contents xv

6.4.2 Settlement and Non-assertion	
Agreements (Gs 204-209)	113
6.4.3 Technology Pools (Gs 210-235)	
Chapter 7 Other Kinds of Commercial and ~ .^	
Industrial Property Rights	T11
7.1 TRADEMARK LICENCES.	
7.1.1 Trademark Licences are Block	122
Exempted only if Ancillary	122
	123
7.1.2 A Trademark Licence May, However,	105
Not Infringe Article 81(1)	125
7.1.3 Exclusive Licence With Restriction On	105
Challenging Validity of Mark,	125
7.1.4 Obligations to Use the Licensor's Trademark "	
On the Licensed Product Not Generally	
Restrictive of Competition	
7.1.5 Trademark Delimitation Agreements	
7.2 TRADITIONAL COPYRIGHT LICENCES	
7.3 LICENCES OF PERFORMING AND RENTAL RIGHTS	130
7.4 CONCLUSION.	130
7.5 SUBCONTRACTING NOTICE (G 44)	131
Chapter 8 Article 82	133
8.1 REFUSALS TO LICENSE.	
8.1.1 Commercial Solvents.	
8.1.2 Volvo	
8.1.3 <i>Magill</i>	
8.1.4 Tierce Ladbroke	
8.1.5 Oscar Bronner	
8.1.6 <i>IMS</i> Appeal to CFI	
8.1.7 Preliminary Ruling in <i>IMS</i>	144
8.1.7.1 Are the Special Circumstances	
in Magill Exhaustive?	144
8.1.7.2 Access must be Essential to Prevent	
all Competition being Eliminated;;	146
8.1.7.3 Secondary Market may be Potential	
or Hypothetical	
8.1.7.4 No Justification	147
8.1.8 Syfait	147
8.1.9 The Commission's Decision in <i>Microsoft</i>	150
8.1.9.1 Dominant Position Over Operating	
Sytems for Client Personal Computers (PCs)	151
8.1.9.1.1 Entry barriers - network effects	
and switching costs - middleware	152
8.1.9.1.2 Overwhelmingly dominant position	

SSi Contents

8.1.9.2 Refusal to Supply Interface Information to	
Competitors Selling Servers	
:i.ii. 8.1.9.2.1 Circumstances that were special	
ui 8.1.9.2.2 Microsoft's justification	156
" 8.1.9.3 Tying the Operating System for Windows	
f I';'" Media Player (WMP) to the Operating	
\" "• ' System for PCs also Constitutes Abuse	
of a Dominant Position	
8.1.9.3.1 Products distinct	
(1.2 8.1.9.3.2 Overwhelming dominant position	
";• 8.1.9.3.3 Consumers deprived of choice	
r, 8.1.9.3.4foreclosure of competitors	
r 8.1.9.3.5 Justification	
8.1.9.4 Remedies for the Infringements	
fi 8.1.9.4.1 Fine	161
"V, '8.1.9A.2 Obligation to supply interface	
,,',"/' '<' information for servers	
";, " 8.1.9.4.3 The remedy for tying	
).['•• 8.1.9.4.4 Remedy not suspended by CFI	
8.1.9.4.5 Comment	
8.2 BIBLIOGRAPHY	167
Chapter 9 General comment on iprs and competition	169
9.1 WAYS IN WHICH EC LAW DIFFERS FROM THE	
US AND IS LESS STRICT THAN PREVIOUSLY	169
9.2 MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH WELCOME	172
	175
Chapter 10 General conclusion	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	176
Appendix I Excerpts from the Treaty establishing	
the European Community	179
Appendix 2 Regulation 19/65	
Appendix 3 Regulation 772/2004.	189
Appendix 4 Commissions guidelines on technology transfer	205
Appendix 5 Commissions guidelines on Article 81(3)	281
Y 1	210
Index	319
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